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Applying a choice experiment on the choice of consumer goods we show that Swedish 
consumers do not regard GMO food as being equivalent to conventional food. A central 
argument by proponents of GMO is that the end products are identical to those where 
GMO has not been used. That respondents in our survey disagree with this argument is 
supported by two observations. First, a positive significant WTP is found for a 
mandatory labeling policy. This result confirms previous observations that GMO food 
can be a credence good causing a market failure. Second, consumers are also willing to 
pay a significantly higher product price to ensure a total ban on the use of GMO in 
animal fodder. Even if scientists and politicians argue that most of today’s GMO food is 
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Consumer benefits of labels and bans on GMO food - An empirical 
analysis using Choice Experiments 
 
Introduction 
  The use of biotechnology in agriculture increases at a fast pace. While the adoption 
rate is relatively faster in developing countries, it is mainly used in a few but relatively 
large agricultural exporting countries. Argentina, Canada and the United States, account 
for ninety-five percent of the global biotechnology acreage in 2002, Clive (2002). The 
European Union (EU), on the other hand, has been relatively cautious about the new 
technology. A moratorium on the approval of new genetically modified organisms 
(GMO), required ability to trace GMO through the food chain and mandatory labeling 
are examples of policies undertaken in the EU in an attempt to at least slow down the 
advance of the use of GMO. Other governments, including the United States’ (US), 
view the EU policies as non tariff trade barriers (Carter and Gruere, 2003; Sheldon, 
2002). Trade barriers are traditionally viewed as welfare reducing measures, imposing a 
cost on consumers in order to protect domestic producers. This conventional wisdom, 
however, may not apply to labeling of GMO food since it has the potential to benefit 
domestic consumers (Lusk and Fox, 2002; Lusk, 2003; Lusk, Roosen and Fox, 2003).  
  Recent EU legislation requires labeling of GMO food; on July 2
nd, 2003, the EU 
Parliament tightened previous regulation on the use of GMOs in food production and 
expanded it to include all genetically modified fodder. Opponents of mandatory labeling 
claim that such a label implies a nonexistent food safety risk, raises marketing costs, 
possibly inhibits further development of GMO technology and is unnecessary as the 
products are similar to their conventional counterparts, Carter and Gruere (2003). In 
response, proponents argue that GMO foods are not equivalent to their conventional   4
counterparts, that consumers should be allowed to decide themselves what to buy and 
that biotechnology creates so-called credence goods, Sheldon (2002).
1  The first-
generation GMOs, also called process-based GMOs, have primarily lowered production 
costs, Phillips and Isaac (1998). While the consumers eventually benefit from lower 
product prices, there have in general not been any detectable differences in product 
quality. If consumers cannot observe whether GMO has been used or not, there is risk 
that this uncertainty eventually drives out what the consumers see as high-quality (non-
GMO) products and only low-quality (GMO) products will prevail, Akerlof (1970). 
Even if we disregard product quality, consumers can still have a preference for GMO 
free products due to what Antle (1999) calls extrinsic, or public good, quality. This is 
when the consumer cares about the production process even if it does not affect product 
quality, for example due to animal, environmental, ethical and religious reasons. This in 
turn implies that a labeling might not be enough, and consumers may prefer a ban of the 
use of GMO since the consumer only can internalize the own perceived disutility caused 
by GMO food with a labeling. Thus the quantity of non-GMO products will be lower 
than what is socially efficient.  
  Little quantitative work has been done to measure whether GMO food is a credence 
good or not. Previous studies of GMO food investigate the demand for beef from cattle 
fed genetically modified corn in the US and four European countries (Lusk, Rosen and 
Fox, 2003), the demand for the label itself in the US (Lusk and Fox, 2003), how the 
inclusion of GMO ingredients change the willingness to pay (WTP) for chocolate chip 
cookies in the US, United Kingdom and France (Lusk, 2003), WTP for GMO labeled 
vegetable oil, tortilla chips and potatoes in the US (Huffman, 2003) and a test of 
whether consumers read GMO labels (Noussair, Robin and Ruffieux, 2002). No study   5
has estimated the benefits to European consumers due to labeling of GMO products nor 
estimated any public good attributes of GMO. Neither has any study covered such a 
broad range of commodities as we do (chicken, beef, hog, and eggs). 
  The objective of this survey is to measure potential market failures with GMO 
foods. Conducting a series of choice experiments applied to animal fodder, Swedish 
consumers’ preferences about GMO foods are explored. We test whether consumers are 
willing to pay a higher product price to ensure that GMO foods are labeled respectively 
banned. Our main results are (i) consumers are willing to pay a substantially higher 
price premium for farm animal products if they are able to distinguish GMO food from 
non-GMO food (labeling) and (ii) consumers are willing to pay even more for a total 
ban of GMO within the EU. This means that we cannot reject the hypothesis of a public 
good character of GMO in food. The results hold for all the farm animal foods 
surveyed. 
 
Testing for the Credence Good and Public Good Hypotheses 
Hypotheses 
  Testing whether GMO is a credence good and whether or not there are public good 
qualities, two null hypotheses are tested. If GMO is not a credence good then the WTP 
for labeled GMO food is zero: 
nolabel label WTP WTP H = : 0 . A significantly higher WTP 
for labeled food is interpreted as a support for the potential of GMO food being a 
credence good. A ban on the use of GMO would not only solve the information problem 
but also the potential market failure due to extrinsic values. The second null hypothesis 
is then that the WTP for a ban on GMO food equals the WTP for labeling: 
ban label WTP WTP H = : 0 . A significantly higher WTP for a ban is interpreted as support   6
for the hypothesis that GMO food creates “extrinsic values”. These null hypotheses are 
tested using a two-sided test as it is possible to rationalize both a higher and negative 
WTP price premium for GMO food. For example, Hamilton et al. (2003) find that 
regulation on food safety can lower WTP as it results in a loss of options.     
 
The Choice Experiment 
  Since one objective is to test whether there are public good qualities associated with 
GMO food it is difficult to use methods that rely on actual market data, instead we have 
to use a stated preference method such as the contingent valuation method (CVM) or a 
choice experiment. Both survey methods ask the respondent to do hypothetical trade-
offs between different attributes. The possibility to include non-existing situations 
makes it possible to empirically test our hypotheses. A CVM survey provides the 
surveyor with a point value estimate of a good with a certain combination of attributes, 
such as color, shape, free range etc. It is difficult, however, or expensive, to estimate the 
value of individual product attributes since each change of an attribute requires a new 
CVM scenario to value. A choice experiment, on the other hand, allows us to estimate 
marginal rates of substitutions between different attributes, existing as well as 
hypothetical. We, therefore, choose to conduct a choice experiment to test our 
hypotheses. For overviews of choice experiments, see Alpizar, Carlsson and Martinsson 
(2003) and Louviere, Hensher and Swait (2000).  
  A number of steps were taken to design a questionnaire that was policy relevant, 
plausible and meaningful to the respondent. First, industry representatives and academic 
researchers specialized on farm animal production were consulted and involved in the 
process of developing the questionnaire. This was followed up by focus groups, where   7
the participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire and write down eventual questions 
and comments. The focus group participants later took part in a round-table discussion 
of the questionnaire. The results from the following pilot survey were returned to the 
individuals and organizations that participated. This was repeated three times until we 
had a satisfactory questionnaire. Each pilot study was distributed to a random sample of 
200 individuals and was conducted during May-September 2003. 
  The resulting questionnaire consists of three parts. The first includes questions about 
the respondent’s and the household’s habits regarding food consumption. The choice 
experiment constitutes the second part and questions regarding the respondent’s socio-
economic status the third part.  
  In the introduction to the choice experiment, the purpose of the survey is briefly 
explained. This is followed by a description of the different attributes. The respondents 
are also provided with a separate fact sheet providing a description of each attribute. 
The provided information on GMO in fodder was 
 
The Swedish Meat Producers’ Association allows for use of genetically modified fodder if it is 
shown that it is not harmful to humans or animals, does not reduce the biological or genetic diversity 
and does not survive or reproduce outside what is intended. Possible alternatives are:  
•  The fodder fulfils the current policy, that is, genetically modified fodder can be used. There 
is no responsibility to inform about this on the food product. 
•  The fodder fulfils the current policy. If genetically modified fodder has been used, this must 
be labeled on the food product. 
•  The use of genetically modified products in fodder is banned.  
  
  Four farm animal products are valued and each questionnaire includes a 
combination of two products: (i) chicken and ground beef or (ii) pork chop and egg. For   8
each product respondents answered four choice sets, i.e. in total eight choice sets. An 
example of a choice situation is presented in the Appendix. The choice sets were created 
using a cyclical design principle (Bunch, Louviere and Andersson 1996). A cyclical 
design is a straightforward extension of the orthogonal approach. First, each of the 
alternatives from a fractional factorial design is allocated to different choice sets. 
Attributes of the additional alternatives are then constructed by cyclically adding 
alternatives into the choice set based on the attribute levels. The attribute level in the 
new alternative is the next higher attribute level to the one applied in the previous 
alternative. If the highest level is attained, the attribute level is set to its lowest level.  
  The choice experiment does not include an opt-out alternative.
2 For all attributes, 
however, the current level is included as one level. Furthermore, we are not primarily 
interested in estimating the total WTP for certain attribute combinations or equivalent 
the actual market share for a certain attribute combinations. Instead we are interested in 
comparing the marginal WTP for certain attributes; in this case for GMO. As argued by 
Lusk and Schroeder (forthcoming) although total WTP is overstated in hypothetical 
experiments, the marginal may not be. This confirms the results of Carlsson and 
Martinsson (2001), they reject the hypothesis of hypothetical bias with respect to 
marginal WTP in a choice experiment. Even if there is a hypothetical bias in marginal 
WTP, our main interest is in the relative magnitude of the estimated WTP for the two 
GMO attributes. 
  The attributes used in the choice experiments vary, as the policy relevant questions 
for different foods are not the same. All of the attributes and in which experiments they 
were included are presented in Table 1.  
   9
>>>>> Table 1 
 
Econometric Specification 
  Assuming a linear indirect utility function, the utility of alternative i in choice 
situation t for individual k is  
(1)  itk it k it itk y a V ε λ β + − + = ) cost   ( ' 
where  i a  is the attribute vector, β is the corresponding parameter vector,  k y  is income, 
λ is the marginal utility of money and  itk ε  is an error term. From this specification the 
mean marginal willingness to pay (WTP) for a certain attribute is the ratio of the 
attribute coefficient and the marginal utility of income (Hanemann, 1984). The 
probability that individual k will chose alternative i can be expressed as 
(2)  { } i j y a y a P P jtk jt k jt itk it k it itk ≠ ∀ > + − + > + − + = ; ) cost ( ' ) cost ( ' ε λ β ε λ β  
  In the analysis of the responses, a random parameter logit model is applied. In such 
a model, taste variation among individuals is explicitly treated (see e.g. Train 1998, 
2003). With this type of model some, or all, parameters are assumed to have a specific 
distribution, for example a normal distribution. In the analysis we pool the two choice 
experiments for the four goods since the experiments are similar to each other.   
However, we still estimate separate valuations of the attributes of the experiments, the 
coefficient that is assumed to be the same across the experiments is the cost coefficient. 
This means that we assume that the marginal utility of money does not vary between the 
two experiments. All attribute parameters are assumed to be normally distributed, which 
means that we estimate a mean and a standard deviation for each of the normally 
distributed parameters. The data has a panel structure since we observe the respondents 
over a sequence of choices. We assume, therefore, that the randomly distributed   10
parameters are constant across the choice situations for each individual. This reflects an 
underlying assumption of stable preference structure for all individuals over the choice 
experiment (Train, 1998). Since the choice experiment is relatively small and simple 
this seems to be a realistic assumption 
 
Results 
  The population that the sample was drawn from was defined as those between 18 
and 75 years with a permanent address in Sweden. A random sample of 1600 
individuals was selected from the Swedish census registry. A mail survey was 
conducted in November-December 2003; two reminders were sent out within a two-
week interval to those that had not replied. In total 747 (47 %) individuals returned the 
questionnaire, of which 710 were available for analysis, due to non-responses to various 
questions. Not all of these answered all eight choice sets, however, we still chose to 
include these individuals in the analysis. Table 2 presents the results for the random 
parameter logit model; for each random parameter the estimated mean and standard 
deviation is reported. The model is estimated with simulated maximum likelihood using 
Halton draws with 250 replications. See Train (2003) for details on simulated maximum 
likelihood and Halton draws. The model is estimated using Nlogit 3.0. 
 
 
>>>>> Table 2 
 
  Most of the attribute parameters are significant and many of the estimated standard 
deviations are significant indicating heterogeneity in preferences among respondents.   11
Furthermore, the relative magnitude of the standard deviations implies that the 
probability that people have the reverse preference for a particular attribute is rather low 
for most attributes in the first experiment (chicken and ground beef). For the other 
experiment (hog and egg) the standard deviations are relatively high for some of the 
attributes.  
  The marginal WTP and the difference in marginal WTP between the two attributes 
are presented in Table 3, together with the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The 
confidence intervals are based on standards errors estimated with the Delta method. 
 
>>>>> Table 3 
 
  The WTP estimates are compared to the baseline where GMO is allowed and not 
labeled. The first null hypothesis is rejected as a significant WTP premium for labeling 
is found for all four food types. This supports the hypothesis that GMO is a credence 
good. Also the second hypothesis of no public good qualities in GMO food is rejected. 
The estimated WTP premium for a total ban on GMO in fodder is significantly higher 
than the premium for labeled food for all four goods.  
  In the presentations of labels on the fact sheet, it is not specified whether the 
commodity they choose is GMO free, only that they will be able to distinguish such 
food from food containing GMO. This design is due to the plausible assumption that 
some respondents may be willing to pay more for a GMO product. The previous 
discussion of credence goods still apply with the GMO food now being the high quality 
good. Our rejection of also the second hypothesis indicates, however, that the 
respondents regard food containing GMO a good of lower quality.          12
  The estimated WTP for the two GMO related attributes are high compared with the 
current market prices. Although our main focus is on the relative marginal WTPs, one 
still need to be cautious in interpreting the actual levels. In particular for an attribute 
such as GMO which, compared with the other attributes, can be relatively prone to 
warm glow.  
 
Conclusions 
  Europeans in general are relatively reluctant to accept the combination of 
biotechnology and food. It is debatable whether this is due to recent food scares such as 
BSE, successful campaigns by ‘green’ lobbyists or the central parts of food and cooking 
in the European culture. No matter what the reasons for this reluctance, we show that 
Swedish consumers do not regard GMO food as being equivalent to conventional food. 
Swedes have been shown to be relatively more averse towards GMO than many other 
Europeans (Hoban, 1997). However, if citizens of other member states in the EU share 
the same type of values, there are important policy implications to be drawn from this 
study. A central argument by proponents of GMO is that the end products are identical 
to those where GMO has not been used. That respondents in our survey disagree with 
this argument is supported by two observations. First, a positive significant WTP is 
found for a mandatory labeling policy, that is, consumers want to be able to identify 
where GMO has been used. This result confirms previous observations that GMO food 
can be a credence good causing a market failure. A second market failure, with 
potentially large welfare consequences, is also found. A label enables the consumer to 
distinguish GMO food from GMO free food. If her associated costs with the former 
food are higher than the price difference, she will naturally choose GMO free food, if   13
any. As a consumer, however, she cannot affect externalities that arise due to 
environmental, religious, ethical, farm animal welfare and other concerns. Our results 
show that the consumer is willing to pay a significantly higher product price to ensure a 
total ban on the use of GMO in animal fodder. Even if scientists and politicians argue 
that most of today’s GMO food is indistinguishable from GMO free food, the 
consumers disagree. 
  Our results can also shed some light on the differences in policies adopted by the US 
and the EU with respect to GMO. In the US relatively few consumers are concerned 
about GMO, and hence a voluntary labeling approach is in use, while in the EU 
consumers are more concerned with GMO and thus the EU requires labeling for food 
that contains more than 0.9 percent of GMO.  
  Further empirical and theoretical work to investigate the robustness of our results is 
warranted. For example, where do the market failures arise, in consumption or 
production? How does information affect the acceptance of GMO food? We leave these 





   14
References 
Akerlof, G.A. (1970). The market for ‘lemons’: quality uncertainty and the market 
mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84: 488-500. 
Alpizar, F., Carlsson F. and Martinsson P. (2003). Using Choice Experiments for Non-
Market Valuation. Economic Issues 8: 83-110. 
Antle, J.M. (1999). The new economics for agriculture. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 81: 993-1010. 
Bunch, D., Louviere, J. and Andersson D. (1996). A comparison of experimental design 
strategies for choice-based conjoint analysis with generic-attribute multinomial logit 
models, Working Paper, Graduate School of Management, University of California, 
Davis. 
Carlsson, F. and Martinsson P. (2001). Do hypothetical and actual marginal willingness 
to pay differ in choice experiments? Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 41: 179-192.  
Carter, C.A. and Gruere, G.P. (2003). International approaches to the labeling of 
genetically modified foods. Choices, second quarter: 1-4.  
Clive, J. (2002). Preview: Global status of commercialized transgenic crops: 2002. 
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications, ISAAA Briefs 
27.  
Darby, M.R. and Karni, E. (1973). Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud. 
Journal of Law and Economics 16: 67-88. 
Hamilton, S.F., D.L. Sunding and D. Zilberman (2003). Public goods and the value of 
product quality regulations: the case of food safety. Journal of Public Economics 87: 
799-817.   15
Hanemann, M. (1984). Welfare evaluations in contingent valuation experiments with 
discrete responses. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 66: 332-341. 
Hoban, T.J. (1997). Consumer acceptance of biotechnology: An International 
Perspective. Nature Biotechnology 15: 232-34. 
Huffman. W.E (2003). Consumer’s acceptance of (and resistance to) genetically 
modified foods in high-income countries: Effects of labels and information in an 
uncertain environment. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85: 1112-1118. 
Louviere, J., Hensher D. and Swait J. (2000). Stated Choice Methods. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Lusk (2003). Consumer Preferences as Impetus for non-tariff trade barriers: 
experimental evidence of demand for genetically modified food in the United States 
and the European Union. Working paper, Department of Agricultural Economics, 
Purdue University.  
Lusk, J.L. and Fox, J.A. (2002). Consumer demand for mandatory labeling of beef from 
cattle administered growth hormones or fed genetically modified corn. Journal of 
Agriculture and Applied Economics 14: 27-38.   
Lusk, J.L., Roosen, J. and Fox, J.A. (2003). Demand for beef from cattle administered 
growth hormones or fed genetically modified corn: a comparison of consumers in 
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 85: 16-29. 
Lusk, J.L. and Schroeder T.C. (2003). Are choice experiments incentives compatible? A 
test with quality differentiated beefsteaks. Forthcoming, American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics   16
Noussair, C., Robin, S. and Ruffieux, B. (2002). Do consumers not care about biotech 
food or do they just not read the labels? Economics Letters 75: 47-53. 
Phillips, P.W.B. and Isaac, G. (1998). GMO labeling: threat or opportunity? 
AgBioForum 1: 25-30. 
Sheldon, I.M. (2002). Regulation of biotechnology: will we ever ‘freely’ trade GMOs? 
European Review of Agricultural Economics 29: 155-176. 
Train, K. (1998). Recreation demand models with taste differences over people. Land 
Economics 74: 230-39. 
Train, K. (2003) Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation. Cambridge University 


















   17
Footnotes 
1. A credence good is a good whose quality cannot be determined by the buyer even 
after consumption (Darby and Karni, 1973). 
2. A respondent would, however, only answer the choice experiment if he or she 
actually consumes the good. So, for example, a vegetarian would not answer the choice 
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Table 1. Attributes and levels  
 
Attribute Levels  Food  type 
   _______________________________
   Chicken  Beef  Hog  Egg 
1. Label  1.1 Minimum required by law       
  1.2 Farm of origin and choice of husbandry        x    x   
2. Fodder  2.1 No information if GMO fodder has been used   
  2.2 Label if GMO fodder has been used 
  2.3 Use of GMO fodder is banned    x    x    x    x 
3. Outdoor  3.1 Herd kept outdoors summer time/Herd 
Production  always kept indoors 
  3.2 Herd kept outdoors all year/Herd kept 
  outdoors summer time    x    x    x     
4. Transport  4.1 Transport of live animals to slaughter house     
  4.2 Mobile slaughter house    x    x    x 
5. Growth  5.1 Fast growth chicken (35-39 days)     
  5.2 Slower growth chicken (at least 81 days)    x     
6. Cages  6.1 Only battery cages   
  6.2 Battery cages and free range systems co-exist            
  6.3 Battery cages are banned                x 
7. Omega 3  7.1 Not Omega 3 enriched 
  7.2 Omega 3 enriched                x 
8. Cost
a  Chicken  0 (80);  +4 (84);  +8 (88);  +12 (92);  +24 (104) 
  Beef  0 (40);  +4 (44);  +8 (48);  +12 (52);  +24 (64) 
  Hog  0 (40);  +4 (44);  +8 (48); +12  (52);  +24  (64) 
  Egg  0 (8);  +2 (10);  +3 (11); +4  (12); +6  (14) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
a. At the time the survey was carried out,  13 . 0 1 USD SEK ≈      
 Table 2. Estimated random parameter logit model. 
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Table 3. Mean marginal WTP in SEK/kg and SEK/half dozen (for egg) and 95% 
confidence intervals.  
 
  Chicken Ground  Beef  Hog  Egg 
Use of genetically modified  19.74  19.40  13.89  8.21    
fodder is banned  (12.0; 27.5)  (14.5, 24.3)  (7.9; 19.9)  (4.6; 11.8) 
 
Label if genetically modified  5.19  7.96  13.89  8.21 
fodder is used  (-.04; 10.8)  (2.8; 13.1)  (-0.7; 6.5)  (0.9; 5.5) 
 
Difference  in  WTP  14.54 11.44 10.97  4.97 
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